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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to give a brief presentation of an approach to developing the conception of 
subjectivity in psychology. This conception is developed on the background of the science of the 
subject of critical psychology as founded by Holzkamp (1983) which considers subjectivity as a core 
concept in human psychology. In the conception presented in this paper, it is argued that human 
subjectivity must be grasped as grounded in a subject’s ongoing situated participation and conduct 
of everyday life in and across various, structurally arranged social practices. It is argued why such 
a conception of subjectivity is necessary and its main concepts are briefly presented. A critical 
identification of methodological and conceptual inadequacies in narrower notions of the psyche and 








The paper briefly presents an approach to developing the conception of subjectivity in 
psychology. It is argued why this particular conception of subjectivity is needed and how it 
must be conceptualized. I developed this conception on the background of the science of 
the subject of critical psychology as founded by Holzkamp (1983) which considers 
subjectivity as a core concept in human psychology. In the conception I developed, human 
subjectivity is grasped as grounded in a subject’s ongoing situated participation and conduct 
of everyday life in and across various, structurally arranged social practices. In this paper, 
a critical identification of methodological and conceptual inadequacies in narrower notions 
of the psyche and subjectivity paves the way for the line of arguments leading to this broader 
conception of subjectivity. It rests on an anti-elementarist and anti-dualist conception of 
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psychological properties which are not defined as mutually independent elements 
containing their own internal essences. Instead, they are grasped as interacting aspects in 
varying configurations of psychological processes in the ongoing activities of situated 
human subjects in varying social practices. In other words, rather than investigating and 
defining a psychological property in isolation, it is determined by what it hangs together 
with in such a complex functioning and by how it contributes to it. The question mark in the 
title of the paper indicates the search for such dynamic nexuses. The first section of the 
paper reminds us of the prevailing, deep-rooted dualism in the notion of the psyche in 
psychology as referring to internal processes/properties as opposed to an external 
objectivity. Subjectivity is mostly conceived as such an internal phenomenon. The second 
section argues that the prevailing methodology of variable-based research on elements of 
the psyche maintains such a notion for methodological reasons and, in so doing, restricts 
our understanding of concrete individual subjectivity. The third section turns to the 
significance of activity which is bypassed in dualist approaches to the subjective versus the 
objective. It is argued that an insufficient grasp of the interconnectedness of psychic 
processes, activity, and the world fosters a skewed understanding of the relations between 
psychic processes and activity. The fourth section argues that the phylogeny of psychic 
processes reveals that psychic processes, activity, and the world are linked in other ways 
than generally assumed in psychology. On this background, the fifth section presents my 
theoretical conception of situated human subjectivity in social practices. I developed it in 
order to become able to capture more fully the phenomena and issues I encountered in my 
empirical research on subjects in social practices. The final sixth section draws conclusions 
from the analyses in this paper. 
Subjectivity and the split between the internal and the 
external 
Subjectivity is not widely addressed in psychology. When it is, it is mostly regarded as an 
internal quality in the mind characterized by subjective experience, perspective, and 
intentionality. This internal subjectivity is contrasted with the objective quality of the 
external, physical and social reality. Such a mentalist and dualist conception of subjectivity 
versus objectivity has profound impacts on how subjectivity and relations between subject 
and object and subject and world are conceptualized. When psychology arose as a discipline, 
it took over such a notion of internal psychological properties from the notions of the soul, 
mind, or psyche in philosophy and theology. That led to the early psychological paradigm 
of internal, human, psychological faculties. In such a paradigm, subjectivity is a higher order 
faculty in the human mind. 
Internal elements and their synthesis  
Faculty psychology was criticized as being speculative by the emerging strands of a new 
empirical psychology based on an experimental methodology and a statistical analysis of 
causal relations between isolated, dependent and independent variables. This empirical 
methodology was to guarantee that psychology is a non-speculative, scientific discipline 
(Danziger, 1990). However, while the new empirical psychology focused on the 
methodological break performed by developing a mainstream empirical psychology as we 
know it, it preserved the basic ontology of the psyche as internal, general faculties and 
functions. The failure to recognize this fundamental continuity behind the methodological 
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break has far-reaching consequences for our understanding of psychic processes and human 
subjectivity.  
The psychological variables in the new mainstream psychology represent general faculties 
and functions of an internal psyche responding to an external, experimental stimulus. The 
empirical methodology breaks down these faculties and functions into variables which are 
investigated and then bundled and generalized into elements of the psyche with separate, 
general essences. A century ago, Edgar Rubin–professor of psychology at the University of 
Copenhagen–wrote in the Proceedings from the 8th International Congress of Psychology in 
1927 that, “the analytic-synthetic psychology quite speedily finds the elements of the soul. 
… [It offers] a more or less detailed account of each of these elements. Subsequently, it 
attempts to construct the more complex formations from these elements. This psychology 
is analytic because it goes down to the elements, and it is synthetic because it attempts to 
use these elements to construct anew with them. … Its contrived wholes are thought to be 
built up from contrived elements.” (1949b, p. 9; translation OD. The last sentence is more 
precise in the German original: “Es handelt sich um gedachte Ganzheiten, die aus gedachten 
Elementen aufgebaut gedacht werden.“) Rubin regards the “synthesis [as] a makeshift 
introduced in order to build up the wholes which had been broken by the ‘analysis’” (1949a, 
p.7-8).  
The generalization of a variable by means of statistical analysis represents a population 
average, that is, a statistical non-person (Danziger, 1990; Holzkamp, 2013a). It offers no 
precise account of individual members of the population scattered across its normal 
distribution–least of all those positioned far from the average. The statistical analysis also 
demands that variables, and the generalized psychological elements based on them, must be 
independent of each other and stand in a relation of causal determination to each other. 
Human psychological characteristics must, then, be fixed properties expressed in 
predictable responses (Dreier, 2019; Raeff, 2019, p. 316).  
This universe of mainstream research is depicted in zillions of models showing separate 
boxes of fixed, generalized elements with arrows of fixed, general causal relations between 
them. These models claim to map the mind, or particular parts of it, but are just “depicting 
a world of interacting variables, rather than a world of interacting people” (Billig, 2013, p. 
186; Raeff, 2019). What is more, they depict an individual perceiving or responding to 
something particular: an independent variable in an otherwise indistinct environment.  
Those working outside of the mainstream psychology of variables, must be aware of these 
characteristics of its psychological concepts when they consider whether and how certain 
insights from mainstream psychology can be reinterpreted and built into non-mainstream 
theories. If they choose to abstain from doing so, their psychological conception of 
subjectivity remains too empty, as a theory with only the concept of subjectivity or a micro-
theory adding only experience, first-person perspective and intentionality. But if they do 
incorporate concepts from variable-based research, subjectivity turns into a super-element 
at the top of a psyche as an internal space with a structural depth. The theory also risks 
installing inconsistencies and contradictions between its different concepts and that reduces 
its analytic strength. Such internal conceptual contradictions are, for instance, often seen in 
personality theories. Many personality theories grasp characteristics associated with 
subjectivity as a super layer above more elementary, psychological functions. But it is not 
made clear how these layers work together or whether their premises cohere. Likewise, 
elements of personality, such as traits, are variabilized but their relations to elementary 
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psychological functions and to the super-layer of personality are underdetermined. In short, 
an integration of subjectivity with mainstream psychological functions risks creating an 
incoherent theory of subjectivity or turning subjectivity into another dualist element in the 
mind. In search of a robust conception of subjectivity, something important is missing. 
Agency and the subject 
In order to transcend the dualist split between the internal and the external in the conception 
of the human psyche, we must emphasize the basic significance of activity in which the 
internal and the external always co-exist, affect each other and hang together inseparably–
in practice. This basic understanding goes back to Marx insisting on conceiving “the thing, 
reality, sensuousness … as human sensuous activity, practice, … subjectively” rather than 
“only in the form of the object or of contemplation” (1969, p. 6; English translation: 
Marx/Engels Internet Archive). Always having researched subjects in practices, gradually 
made me realize how crucial such a theoretical stance is for psychology and why. Activity 
is an ongoing process (Dreier, 2008; Raeff, 2019) and subjectivity is a complex quality of 
human agency in ongoing activity (González Rey, 2020). Subjectivity is not only involved 
before and after an activity–as subjects plan and prepare for it beforehand and reflect on it 
afterwards–but in their ongoing activity as participants in social practices (Dreier, 2020; in 
press). This is where, and how, we may rediscover and reconceptualize subjectivity and 
psychological processes.  
But that is rarely acknowledged in psychology which mostly bypasses this basic insight or 
includes it in limited ways. Subjectivity and agency are, then, mostly defined as separate 
concepts. Subjectivity then refers to something separate from activity residing in the realm 
of internal characteristics. Psychological studies of subjectivity, accordingly, focus on 
experience, meaning, sense, intention, motive, and goal. This is not always due to an explicit 
delimitation of subjectivity from activity but to a prioritizing of what is studied and what is 
given only a cursory treatment or left indistinctly in the background. But doing so inevitably 
leads back into a dualist position of extracting knowledge about general, internal 
psychological characteristics independent of activity. We also comprehend experience etc. 
as free-floating if we do not study these internal processes as involved in ongoing activity. 
Omitting activity and the socio-structural arrangement of practices is, furthermore, 
promoted by the implicit pre-understanding of how the discipline of psychology is delimited 
and of what its research must concentrate on and illuminate if it is to count as relevant and 
legitimate, namely: an internal psyche.  
If we adopt an internalized notion of the psyche and the subject, we merely consider activity 
as an expression of what goes on in the mind. Activity then only matters because it helps us 
understand what goes on in the mind of others which we have no direct access to. But 
subjects not only express themselves in activity. They also develop and come to understand 
themselves through activity in the world. Their present abilities and understandings have 
developed in that way. A dualist approach to learning understands this process from outside 
in as an acquisition and internalization in the mind and it regards the process from inside 
out as an application of what was already internalized. The significance of situated activity 
in learning (Lave, 1988) is glossed over in the processes going in both directions. And 
learning is primarily seen as a matter of acquiring and applying general knowledge while a 
subject’s abilities to do certain things in various situated contexts is glossed over and 
assumed to be ensured by the generality of the acquired knowledge.  
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The idea that an individual’s activity is governed by his or her internal psychological 
capacities emphasizes only these internal capacities. But this idea is often expressed shortly 
after the opposite idea of the individual being determined by his or her external conditions. 
It then serves as a counter-argument against objective determinism. Having command over 
his or her activity rescues the individual from external determinism while the contradiction 
between being determined by the world and/or determining the world through command 
over one’s individual activity persists. It is also mostly argued that individual command 
only becomes possible by developing powerful, internal capacities which enable a general 
command over one’s activity precisely because these internal capacities are general. The 
individual, the I, or the subject, is then a commander general.  
The idea of internal determination over individual activity is found in much personality 
psychology. Thus, personality traits are defined as fixed, general causes of individual 
behavior. They are studied by having individuals fill in questionnaires about, among other 
things, their behavioural tendencies without studying their behaviours and the situations in 
which they occur. Trait research has done so for decades, thus, essentially claiming that an 
individual with a certain trait exhibits a certain typical behavior across situations. But the 
individual’s behavior is assumed to follow the command of his or her internal trait without 
studying the interplay between trait, behavior, and situation more closely and directly. Trait 
research continues along this line in spite of a fifty years old, unresolved person-situation 
debate and more recent voices, such as Funder who, in a review of personality psychology 
(2001), reminded this field of research that any statement about a trait implicitly 
presupposes assumptions about the behaviours and the situations in which it is expressed 
(cf. Dreier, 2011).  
In summing up this section of the paper, I pointed out unresolved issues resulting from a 
dualist notion of the internal versus the external which disregards the significance of 
activity. Such a dualist notion fosters the vain hope that if only subjects possess the right 
general capacities, they become masters of their world. But when the course of a subject’s 
activity falls out of focus, so does his or her practical relations with the world in the world. 
As embodied beings, subjects are anchored in their activities in the world. Their 
psychological processes are not simply contained in their mind. They are aspects of 
subjects’ participation in situated nexuses of practice. The mind is in the body, in activity, 
in situated social practices. This understanding will be elaborated in the remainder of the 
paper. 
Psycho-phylogeny and the nexus 
I shall now argue that the phylogenetic evolution of the psyche underlines that we must 
comprehend psyche, activity and world as inextricably connected. I do so by presenting and 
reinterpreting some key characteristics of the phylogeny of psychic processes as analysed 
by Leontjew (1973), Holzkamp (1973, 1977, 1983), Schurig (1975a, 1975b, 1976), 
Osterkamp (1975), and Messman and Rückriem (1978). These authors reconstructed only 
the evolutionary path leading to the emergence of the human species. Species on later 
positions in that pathway may, therefore, be assumed to have developed other, more 
powerful functional potentialities than species on earlier positions in it.   
From the very beginning of psycho-phylogeny, in the most elementary form of psychic 
sensibility, psychic capacities transcend the premises of the dualist paradigm and the 
experimental psychology of variables. In Leontjew’s (1973) well-known example, the 
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psychic sensibility of a spider triggers and guides its activity towards a prey by responding 
to the connection between vibrations in its web and prey caught in it. Already this simple 
sensibility is not a response to an isolated stimulus in the environment but to connections 
between properties in the environment–vibration and prey–which are inextricably linked 
with each other. Leontjew states that psychic processes capture properties of the 
environment in their “Zusammenhang” (1973, p. 37). This term literally means hanging 
togetherness and it plays an important role in critical psychology which I emphasize and 
develop even further. In the English edition of Leontjew’s book, it is translated as 
connection or link. But these terms do not sufficiently connote that properties hang together 
and cannot be separated from each other. I, therefore, chose nexus as English term. In 
Leontjew’s example, prey and vibration do hang together. That is what makes sensing the 
vibration matter to the spider. The genesis of psychic sensibility is, in fact, linked to the 
transition from a more homogenous to a more heterogeneous environment on our planet 
where objects are present and hang together in a nexus. Leontjew’s term objective activity, 
thus, refers to an activity directed at more or less complex objects in a heterogenous nexus 
where they stand out and can be focused on in activity and psyche as they are present in 
their nexus. What is more, the evolution of psychic processes hangs together with the animal 
changing place in the environment, that is, with the relation between the animal’s psychic 
processes and its activity in a heterogeneous, structured world. Indeed, the evolution of 
species with more complex and powerful psychic processes is fostered by changes in the 
environment and activity.   
According to Holzkamp (1983), the next step in the psycho-phylogeny is a change from 
sensing an object in its nexus to also sensing relations between several objects in a nexus 
and distinguishing between their properties and positions in it. This is a change in the 
direction of grasping nexuses as such and of subjectively configuring relevant coexistences 
and combinations of properties in nexuses.  
The evolution of emotional qualities of experience reveals an increased complexity of 
interrelated psychic processes. Emotions capture, and express an evaluation of, the meaning 
of properties and nexuses in the world depending on the state of the organism (ibid., p. 95). 
An animal’s readiness to act and its realization of meaning is thus linked with the state of 
the organism as reflected in its complex emotional state and variations in this state are the 
basis for the realization of meaning. The emotional evaluation is an aspect of the animal’s 
orientation in which cognition and emotion are linked and interacting, rather than separate, 
psychic aspects (ibid., p. 107).  
In the next step in psycho-phylogeny, psychic processes no longer function in a fixed, 
species-specific way. They become modifiable and the scope of their individual 
modifiability is a genetic characteristic of a certain species (ibid., p. 123). This modifiability 
is what we usually mean by learning. So, learning leads to dynamic changes in the relations 
between activities, life-conditions, and psychic functioning. How these relations are 
changeable and to what extent, distinguish the various stages in the psycho-phylogeny of 
learning. Learning is, in other words, not conceived as the acquisition and internalization of 
general knowledge but as changing the relationship between psychic functioning, activities, 
and life-conditions. In early forms of learning in psycho-phylogeny, this change of 
orientation only occurs during the execution of activities to fulfil needs in environmental 
nexuses (ibid., p 107). Later, activities of orientation become differentiated from activities 
of execution and, even later, the learning of orientation and evaluation is internalized.  
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At his point, my analysis differs from Holzkamp’s and Leontjew’s notions of internalization 
as an internalized orientation and evaluation. If the psychic basis of the ongoing activity of 
a species only consists in executing an orientation which was learned and internalized 
earlier, its repertoire of activities must be narrow and fixed. The environmental situations 
and nexuses of its activities can then not vary and change much either. Indeed, the notion 
of internalization is introduced in animal species with fixed chains of activities. It belongs 
to a type of learning which Holzkamp (1983) calls subsidiary in which capacities and 
activities are modified and then persist as fixed orientations in relation to fixed chains of 
activity. Learning hence represents a feedback from execution to orientation which, thus 
modified, remains fixed and governs future executions. It establishes a complete governing 
of execution by a complete prior orientation.  
However, the psychic aspects of an animal’s activities cannot remain fixed if its 
environments, and the activities of other creatures in those environments, vary and change. 
On the contrary, that calls for further learning. The notion of internalization of a set of fixed, 
general capacities is, therefore, over-generalized if it is applied to later species such as 
human beings existing and unfolding their activities in complex, varying, and changing 
nexuses of social practice which call for varying and changing subjective capacities. It is, 
on the contrary, a necessary precondition for the socio-cultural development of human 
subjectivity that human abilities are not fixed, internalized capacities but incomplete, 
general potentials modifiable through open-ended learning (Dreier, 2008). In such forms of 
life, psychic processes and learning must be involved and unfold ongoingly in, and across, 
courses of activity. Or else human subjects cannot remain sensitive to situated similarities, 
differences, variations, and changes of aspects and their interplay in varying and changing 
nexuses of social practice. A merely general characteristic of a human capacity is, therefore, 
at best incomplete. And a subject’s complex, internal processes are not decoupled from and 
do not completely command his or her ongoing activities. They are complexly and varyingly 
involved in his or her varying and changing activities and environments. Indeed, a subject’s 
psychic processes and activities must not only be modifiable but also variable, that is, fitted 
to the varying, concrete, ongoing situations at hand. A flexibility of functioning involves 
modifiability as well as variability (Dreier, 2019).  
My arguments above have deep implications for our understanding of the evolutionary steps 
closer to the species characteristics of human beings. In this paper, I shall merely mention 
a few characteristics highlighted by Holzkamp in later step of this evolutionary pathway. 
First of all, he highlights the emergence of autarch learning as “the learned changeability of 
sequences of activity” (1983, p. 140). Here learning unfolds in explorations of the 
surroundings capturing connections in the surroundings so that the “sequence of activity ... 
may be structured and centred anticipatingly on the final activity” (ibid., p. 142). He also 
points to “a general basic need for spontaneous exploration of the surroundings … [and] 
orientation about what is new” in exploratory activity and learning (ibid., p. 144; translations 
OD) indicating an open-ended kind of learning. And he adds that anxiety is linked to autarch 
learning when encountering something unknown and unmanageable. Like autarch learning, 
anxiety has an anticipatory emotional character which is also seen in the emotional 
evaluation of being motivated to get involved in future-directed activities. These 
anticipatory emotional evaluations are core characteristics of autarch learning. These 
notions come closer to human subjectivity. But human subjectivity holds even more 
complex and powerful potentialities which must be grounded in relation to the basic 
cultural, historical, societal forms of life characteristic of human beings (Holzkamp, 1983). 
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My arguments above and in the next section suggest ideas for a renewed analysis of the 
psycho-phylogeny of human subjectivity and its specifically human qualities. 
Subjects situated in social practices 
This section presents core concepts in the theory of human subjectivity which I developed. 
Using the theory of subjectivity in critical psychology (Holzkamp, 1983) to analyse 
materials from my empirical studies of subjects as participants in social practices, revealed 
that some conceptual expansions and revisions were necessary in order to become able to 
capture the phenomena I encountered more fully. These conceptual developments were also 
fueled by comparing these phenomena critically with prevailing notions in research about 
those fields of practice. 
In one field of my research (e.g., Dreier, 2008), I studied how clients attending therapy 
address and change their problems across the various situated social practices in their 
everyday lives including their temporarily added, intermittent therapy sessions. This 
approach transcends the abstract generalizations of diagnoses, problems and therapy in a 
population by reconsidering them as parts of the complex, ongoing everyday lives of client 
subjects.  
In another field of research (e.g., Dreier, 2002), I studied how the work of psychological 
practitioners with their clients is entangled in, and affected by, the social arrangements of 
their complex, professional work practices. For instance, these arrangements enroll 
practitioners in contradictions of their practice with clients. On the one hand, practitioners 
are held accountable for what they do with their clients by abstract, general categories of 
diagnoses and problems based on generalized population averages and by abstractly 
generalized procedures of evidence-based practice to be adhered to in carrying out their 
work. On the other hand, their work is meant to help clients overcome their problems by 
addressing them in varying ways in between what else goes on in and across the various 
social practices of their everyday lives. Practitioners must, therefore, account for, reflect on 
and conduct their work in contradictory ways. These contradictions complicate their situated 
work with clients, their analyses of their cases, and their evaluations of their professional 
efforts.  
In both fields, I studied processes of change and learning by focusing on subjects 
participating in situated social practices where they are assumed to apply what they have 
learned elsewhere but where they do and learn many other things (e.g., Dreier, 2015). Lave’s 
(1988) call for a change of research on learning from studying trees of knowledge to 
landscapes of practice, inspired this shift in focus on change and learning. Finding similar 
issues in different fields of research also triggered the development of my theoretical 
conception. Mainstream research in these fields investigates an isolated expert situation of 
professional practice assuming that what is found here is the general cause of subjects’ 
activities elsewhere and later. Subjects’ ongoing activities are not in focus or merely 
regarded as the execution of general, mental capacities. An uneasy contradiction between 
abstract, generalized knowledge and concrete, personal experience–and various attempts to 
tinker with this contradiction–persists for subjects in these fields of practice as a symptom 
of the need to reconceptualize these practices and subjects’ involvements in them.  
These studies underline that a theory of human subjectivity must capture the significance of 
the social practices which subjects live in for the formation and functioning of their 
subjectivity. A psychological theory of subjectivity must, therefore, include concepts about 
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those aspects of social practices that are crucial to comprehend individual subjectivity. I 
shall now briefly present a set of core concepts about individual subjectivity in nexuses of 
social practice. These concepts expand the line of arguments in the previous sections. 
As argued above, human psychological functions must be conceptualized as ongoing 
processes unfolding in the ongoing activity of a human subject (cf. Raeff, 2019). Human 
psychological processes and activity are inseparable, and the psychological processes 
interact, integrate, and unfold ongoingly and varyingly in a subject’s varying activities and 
pursuits. On the background of what a subject learned earlier, his or her processes of 
sensing, observing, thinking, imagining, and emotional valuing interact and influence each 
other in varying configurations in his or her ongoing activity (cf. González Rey, Mitjánz 
Martínez, & Goulart, 2018; Dreier, in press). The wide-ranging scope of human 
psychological functioning across time also enables subjects to reflect intermittently, 
reconsidering and revaluing what happened earlier (Maiers, 1996). But if a subject reflects 
on an outcome of a past activity without considering how that activity brought this outcome 
about, he or she misinterprets what went on in the activity and turned into its outcome as if 
it were already fully present in his or her mind beforehand. A subject’s prior orientation 
then seems to be the necessary and sufficient basis for his or her execution of his or her 
activity–as in a causal relation between independent and dependent variables. But, on the 
contrary, reflections beforehand on things to come are enriched and modified as activities 
and events unfold. 
Moreover, as an embodied being a human subject is always situated. A subject’s ongoing 
activities and psychological processes–including his or her reflections–unfold in a situated 
way in a local social context, that is, in an arranged local nexus of social practice. His or her 
activities and psychological processes are not a response to an isolated stimulus but 
inextricably and variably situated and involved in a nexus of social practice with other 
qualities than the environmental nexuses of animal species. In targeting his or her current 
pursuit of concerns, a subject focuses on certain aspects of this nexus. And he or she 
configures his or her psychological processes ongoingly and varyingly from his or her first-
person perspective in his or her ongoing pursuit of this concern in this nexus–and so forth 
as his or her chain of ongoing activities and concerns unfolds. A subject’s psychological 
processes and activities must, therefore, be grasped in more comprehensive connections in 
the world than merely in relations between subjects as theories of subjectivity mostly do if 
they reach beyond the skin of a single subject. A subject’s inner world exists, is configured, 
and unfolds in the nexus of a local context of social practice. What is more, a local context 
of social practice serves particular purposes and is arranged accordingly in particular ways. 
It holds particular positions for taking part in it with particular scopes of possibilities for 
those occupying them and particular relations between participants on different positions in 
its ongoing social practice. A subject’s participation in it is a matter of its meaning and 
scopes of possibilities for him or her and of his or her pertinent abilities. A social practice 
is also marked by social contradictions and conflicts between participants leading to 
struggles and alliances between them. These contradictions and conflicts may be overcome, 
more or less, by subjects joining in the pursuit of common concerns. All this affects how 
subjects configure and unfold their ongoing participation with its psychological processes. 
Subjectivity must, therefore, be conceptualized as involved in situated participation in a 
nexus of social practice. Human subjects are participants, and their activities are a personal 
social practice. If we do not theorize them as such, they remain conceptually 
underdetermined. Subjects’ processes of sensing, observing, thinking, valuing, imagining, 
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reflecting, etc.–as well as how they draw on prior learning and abilities–belong to and unfold 
in their ongoing participation. The participatory nature of human subjectivity and activity 
underlines why internal processes in an individual subject cannot hold complete command 
over his or her activity. In fact, subjects re-produce and change their lives by taking part in 
re-producing and changing their social practices together with, and in struggles with, other 
participants and, ultimately, by contributing to re-produce and change current societal 
practices. 
But the conception of subjectivity must be extended even further. In living their lives, 
subjects take part in many different social practices in different, local social contexts. This 
distribution of different social practices into different contexts is an important characteristic 
of the structural arrangement of the social practice of a society and subjects take part in them 
by moving into them and across them in their personal trajectories of participation. But the 
social practices in their other contexts serve other purposes and hold other arrangements and 
positions, co-participants and scopes of possibilities. In their trajectories of participation, 
subjects take part in re-producing and changing these social practices and their structural 
arrangements. But in their other social practices, subjects take part in other ways and pursue 
other concerns–or the same concern in other ways. How they participate, then, varies and 
differs across space–not just across time as most psychology claims. Subjects’ varying, 
situated participation across different social practices increases the complexity and 
variability of their personal functioning. They configure their participation differently from 
their different positions and situated first-person perspectives with varying involvements 
and configurations of their psychological processes of feeling and motivation, sensing, 
observing, thinking, and imagining across different nexuses of social practice. Mainstream 
research in psychology does not focus on such variations. It captures variations between 
subjects in an isolated situation as variations in a population while variations in individual 
subjects can only be captured by studying their participation in various contextual nexuses 
of social practice. Strictly speaking, research limited to one situation per subject can not 
prove that subjects function in a uniform manner on the basis of general, elementary 
psychological functions as necessary and sufficient conditions.  
A final extension of the psychological theory of subjectivity is necessary. A subject’s 
trajectory of participation is involved in how that subject conducts his or her everyday life 
together with his or her various co-participants in and across his or her various contextual 
social practices (Dreier, 2011, 2016; Holzkamp, 2013b). Living in a complexly arranged 
societal practice, subjects must take care that their complex life hangs together and does not 
fall apart. They must also take care to get done what is necessary for them and what matters 
most to them. To accomplish this, they must make arrangements of their everyday lives and 
their participations in its various nexuses of social practices. They must also coordinate 
these personal arrangements with their various co-participants and with their joint 
arrangements of their shared social practices and, furthermore, they must construct their 
arrangements in relation to the societal arrangements for living everyday lives. As a 
consequence, particular social practices and particular personal activities and concerns gain 
a particular status and meaning for a subject in the nexus of his or her conduct of everyday 
life. What is more, as parts of their arrangements, subjects must develop routines to get done 
what they must do more easily and in accordance with their preferences. These routines can 
be more or less fixed or open to variations. Individual subjects often have different 
preferences about that and this fuels recurrent conflicts and negotiations between them. 
They also differ in how uniform and predictable or varying they prefer their everyday lives 
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to be and in which respects. Finally, subjects encounter more encompassing aspects and 
contradictions of the dynamic structure of a society as they are involved in and affect various 
parts of their conduct of everyday life. How these encompassing aspects and contradictions 
matter to them and how they may address and influence them, vary accordingly. When they 
engage in influencing them more than occasionally, they must rearrange their conduct of 
everyday life. The concept of conduct of everyday life comprises all the complex 
endeavours sketched above. In its concrete complexity, subjects’ conduct of everyday life 
affects their various participations and the relative significance of their various pursuits and 
concerns as well as their processes of change and learning (Dreier, 2015; Schraube & 
Marvakis, 2016). The concept offers a complex frame for reaching a coherent grasp of 
human subjectivity in the complex lives of subjects in concrete social practices. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that we must change our conception of psychic functions instead of 
taking over their characteristics from mainstream research. Mainstream research captures 
them as mutually independent, average population elements and as necessary and sufficient 
causal conditions for a response. But they are interacting and varying aspects of subjects’ 
situated participation from their first-person perspective in structurally arranged nexuses of 
social practice. They can, therefore, not be defined as a fixed generality and their definition 
cannot be well-defined in the sense of a delimited, complete, and isolated entity and a 
necessary and sufficient cause (Dreier, 2019). Notions of internalization of so-called higher 
psychic functions also assume a generalized uniformity of functioning rather than that more 
complex psychic functions are more variable and modifiable. Psychic functions are 
configured by a subject in his or her ongoing situated participation in and across different 
nexuses of social practice. This is what subjectivity accomplishes and what we must capture 
in its definition (cf. González Rey, Mitjánz Martínez, & Goulart, 2018; Holzkamp, 1983). 
When a subject configures these interacting, functional aspects in his or her first-person 
perspective on his or her ongoing situated participation, they integrate in complex qualities 
of subjective processes such as the subjectively experienced, complex emotional state 
guiding his or her involvements (Dreier, 2020; Holzkamp, 1983).  
It should be clear by now why this paper is called “Subjectivity and?”. An elaborated theory 
comprises a nexus of concepts. A psychological conception of subjectivity which does not 
include concepts about its aspects and processes is too empty. Elaborating a conception of 
subjectivity, requires conceptualizing it in a differentiated way. Doing it rightly, implies 
conceptualizing it as it exists and unfolds in a subject’s situated trajectory of participation 
and conduct of everyday life from his or her first-person perspective in nexuses of social 
practice. We may then grasp how human beings live by taking part in reproducing and 
changing their complex social practices.  
However, many psychological researchers fear that we lose the subject if we attend too 
much to social processes and formations. In contrast, I argued that our grasp of 
psychological phenomena disintegrates in an internal and an external part unless we 
conceive psychological capacities and formations as I suggest. While so much work has 
been invested in examining the internal per se, the external has been included too narrowly, 
and there is a huge neglect in addressing and conceptualizing the two as they hang together 
in subjects’ ongoing, situated participation in nexuses of social practice. Psychology 
remains analytically and conceptually underdetermined until this is done more broadly. To 
do so, we must become better at characterizing socio-cultural, historical practices, contexts, 
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and arrangements in terms particularly relevant and necessary for psychology stimulated by 
a more adequate and elaborate interdisciplinary collaboration with other social sciences. 
How can we fear to lose the subject if we believe in its worldliness but have only just begun 
examining it? Arguing that we are losing it, echoes a deep conceptual chasm of subject 
versus object. The qualities, significances, and courses of internal processes cannot be 
grasped adequately and completely if not in and through subjects living and functioning as 
participants in nexuses of situated social practices. Culture, society, and history are then not 
external to their functioning and course but in them. It takes profound reconsiderations of 
the internal processes, functions and capacities to connect them adequately with subjects’ 
ongoing participation in social practices. This is the challenge we face. 
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